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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this appeal are as follows: 
Glade Parduhn, who was the plaintiff below and is an appellant in this Court. Parduhn 
was a partner with Brad Buchi, deceased, in University Texaco from 1979 to 1997 and the 
named beneficiary under insurance policy NL00989085 (the "Policy") on the life of Brad 
Buchi. 
University Texaco, a dissolved Utah partnership, and potential intervenor. University 
Texaco sought to intervene following remand and is an appellant in this Court. Brad Buchi 
and Glade Parduhn formed University Texaco, and through it they owned and operated two 
service stations. 
Natalie Buchi Bennett, appellee, was the original defendant in this case. Her siblings, 
Alison Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi (sometimes collectively with 
Natalie the "Buchi Children"), subsequently joined the action as defendants and 
counterclaimants, and are also appellees in this Court. The Buchi Children claimed an 
interest in the proceeds of the Policy under a Buy Sell Agreement between Parduhn and 
Buchi. All are the children of Brad Buchi, deceased, and Lissa Buchi, his ex-wife. At the 
time this suit was filed, all but two had reached the age of majority. 
JoAnne Buchi, appellee, joined the suit as a counterclaimant when the Buchi Children 
other than Natalie joined. Joanne Buchi married Brad Buchi in 1992, and was married to 
him at the time of his death, although they were separated and she had sued for divorce. 
Joanne appears in this case in her individual capacity and as executor of Brad Buchi's estate. 
1 
She also claims an interest individually in the Policy proceeds. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal filed by University Texaco raises two legal issues: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying University Texaco's Motion 
to Intervene? This is a legal question subject to the discretion of the trial court; the 
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Utah State Department of Social 
Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1996) (stating appropriate standard of review in 
a case involving permissive intervention). 
2. Did the trial court err in not awarding the Policy Proceeds to University Texaco 
on equitable grounds? This is a mixed question of law and fact. In cases of equity, this 
Court may exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both questions of law and 
questions of fact, and will reverse on the facts when the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the trial court, or where the trial court has based its rulings upon a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, §9; Reed v. 
Alvey, 610 R2d 1374, 1377; (Utah 1980); Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 
1981). The Court gives no deference to the legal findings of the trial court. Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 61 P.3d 984 (Utah 2002). 
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RECORD CITATIONS OF ISSUE RAISED BELOW 
University Texaco raised the issues relating to its motion to intervene in pleadings 
and at oral argument before the trial court. See R. 1746-1750; 1883-1888 and Transcript 
of hearing on remand, May 9, 2003 ("Hr'g Tr.") at 2-13. 
University Texaco raised the issues relating to its claim on the merits in pleadings 
and at oral argument below. See R. 1724-1735; 1877-1882 and Hr'g Tr. at 14-21 and 40-
52. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW 
The trial court denied University Texaco's Motion to Intervene. The court based its 
ruling on the fact that University Texaco had not intervened prior to trial, and also stated 
that Glade Parduhn, the sole surviving partner, adequately represented the interests of the 
Partnership, which had no interest in the outcome. This ruling constitutes plain error and an 
abuse of discretion, as the court failed to consider all the circumstances of the case as 
required on a motion to intervene of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P., and 
erroneously applied a likelihood of success on the merits test. 
The court also committed reversible error in awarding the Policy proceeds to the 
Buchi Heirs. It based its ruling on facts not in evidence; it ignored evidence both in the 
record and presented to it in proffers, and it ignored substantial equitable arguments against 
the distribution ordered. A ruling without basis in fact or law requires reversal. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
OR RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THE OUTCOME 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (Copy attached at Appendix Tab 1) 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely applications anyone shall 
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers 
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Background Facts 
This case involves a dispute over the disposition of the proceeds of a life insurance 
policy, # NL00989085 (the "Policy") on the life of Brad Buchi, deceased. Brad Buchi and 
Glade Parduhn, plaintiff and appellant, formed a partnership, University Texaco (sometimes 
referred to as the "Partnership"), pursuant to Utah law, in 1979. Through the Partnership, 
they owned and operated several service stations. When Parduhn and Buchi formed 
University Texaco, Buchi was married to Lissa Buchi. The partners executed a written 
partnership agreement and also entered into a "buy-sell" agreement (the "Buy Sell 
Agreement"). Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit ("Pltf. Ex.") I.1 They funded the Buy Sell Agreement 
The transcript of the trial and the trial exhibits were not included in the record counsel 
(continued...) 
with insurance policies on each other's life in the amount of $20,000. Id. Initially, the Buy 
Sell Agreement provided in relevant part: 
Both partners will be insured for $20,000 and all of which will 
go to the deceased persons wife or survivors. 
Pltf. Ex. 1. 
The partners decided to increase the amount of insurance on each other to $100,000 
in 1984. They rewrote the Buy Sell Agreement when they purchased the additional 
insurance to reflect the increase: 
The Buy-Sell insurance will be $100,000. In the event of a 
death of either partner, the remaining partner shall pay $ 100,000 
to the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of the 
$100,000 insurance policy which each own on each other. 
Pltf. Ex. 2. 
Five years later, in 1989, the partners again increased the amount of life insurance 
coverage on each other when they purchased the Policy and a similar policy on Parduhn's 
life. This time they did not amend the Buy Sell Agreement. R. 1449. The Partnership paid 
the premiums on both the Policy and the similar policy insuring Parduhn's life. Tr. at 46. 
Also in 1989, Buchi took out another policy insuring his life in the amount of 
$250,000. That policy named his wife Lissa as primary beneficiary and their children as 
1
 (...continued) 
obtained from the district court, and repeated calls to the clerks office of this Court and the 
district courts in Summit and Salt Lake County did not turn up those documents. Therefore, 
the references to the transcript and exhibits do not include the record pagination. Copies of 
the trial transcript and admitted exhibits obtained from counsel for Parduhn are included in 
the Appendix at Tabs 1 and 2 for the Court's reference. 
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secondary beneficiaries. Pltf. Ex. 5. 
In 1992, Brad and Lissa Buchi divorced; also in 1992 Brad Buchi married Joanne 
Buchi.2 Tr. at 151. Brad Buchi and Joanne Buchi had no children together. Joanne Buchi 
sued for divorce in April 1996. That action was pending when Brad Buchi died. Buchi v. 
Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, CivNo.964901449 DA. Buchi died intestate; 
Joanne Buchi has been named the personal representative of his estate. In re Estate of Brad 
Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 973901394; see also testimony of 
Joanne Buchi, Tr. at 153. 
In July 1997, the partners sold the two service stations owned by University Texaco 
to Blackett Oil Co. in an asset sale. Tr. at 31. This dissolved the Partnership. Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 61 P.3d 982,984-85 (Utah 2002). Three weeks later, Buchi died. The partners had 
not wound up the Partnership's affairs before Buchi died, and in fact the winding up 
continues due to the pendency of this lawsuit. 
Following Buchi's death, Parduhn, as the named beneficiary on the Policy at issue 
here, applied for the Policy proceeds with the insurance company, Northern Life. Northern 
Life informed Parduhn that Natalie Buchi Bennett, Brad and Lissa Buchi's oldest daughter, 
had also claimed the proceeds. Parduhn filed this case, disputing Natalie Buchi Bennett's 
claim to the Policy proceeds. 
2
 Although Joanne and Brad Buchi were married at the time of his death, Joanne Buchi 
had sued for divorce and they were separated; the status of their marriage was an issue on 
remand that the court refused to consider. See Point H.C. 1. below. All the Buchi children 
are the children of Brad Buchi and Lissa Buchi. 
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Procedural History of the Case 
Parduhn originally filed this action against Natalie Buchi Bennett only, as she was the 
only person to have made a claim on the Policy proceeds. R. 1-8. Subsequently, Northern 
Life interpleaded the Policy proceeds into court pursuant to stipulation by the parties. R. 33-
35. Following a motion by Parduhn to have Natalie Buchi join all necessary parties, the 
remaining Buchi Children and Joanne Buchi, (purportedly in her capacity as personal 
representative of the estate of Brad Buchi as well as individually) joined as defendants and 
filed an amended answer and counterclaim. Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 275-
281.3 
The case was originally set for trial before Judge Stirba. In March 2000, Judge Stirba 
signed a scheduling order that set August 18,2000 as the cut off date for all motions except 
motions in limine. R. at 344. On October 26, 2000, Joanne Buchi filed pleading styled a 
"Motion in Limine" seeking to have the court declare that Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5) 
applied to bar plaintiff Glade Parduhn from receiving any of the Policy proceeds. R. 1093 
at 1094 (Motion) and R. 1096 at 1098 (Memorandum in Support of Motion). 
Following Judge Stirba's death, the case was transferred to Judge Lubeck, who held 
a bench trial in August 2001 and issued findings in a Memorandum Decision. R. 1448-145 8. 
The trial court found that the sale of its major assets dissolved the Partnership. R. 1451. He 
also held that the Buy Sell Agreement survived the sale of the service stations and governed 
3
 Brad Buchi's ex-wife, Lissa, to whom he had been married when he took out the 
Policy, disclaimed any interest in the Policy for herself or her minor children. R. 3 81-3 82. 
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disposition of the Policy proceeds. Id. The court also found that the Partnership paid the 
premiums on the Policy. R. 1452. The existence of the Buy Sell Agreement made 
ambiguous the policy's beneficiary designation of Glade Parduhn. R. 1454. The court 
therefore held that although the Policy named Parduhn as the beneficiary, the Buy Sell 
Agreement required the court to award the Policy proceeds to Joanne Buchi and the Buchi 
Children. R. 1458. Glade Parduhn appealed the decision to this Court.4 
This Court issued its ruling on appeal on September 6, 2002. It found that the sale 
of the partnership's major assets caused the dissolution of the partnership. Parduhn V. 
Bennett, 61 P.3d 982, 984-85, fl8. It reversed both the holding that the Buy Sell Agreement 
survived that event, and the holding that the Buy Sell Agreement made the beneficiary 
designation ambiguous. Id. at 984, J7 and 986, f 15. The Buchi heirs were not entitled to 
the Proceeds, the Court ruled, because the Buy Sell Agreement was no longer effective. In 
a matter of first impression, however, the Court also ruled that the dissolution of the 
Partnership ended Parduhn's insurable interest in Buchi1 s life pursuant to 31A-21-104 (l)(b) 
and (2)(a). Id at 986, [^16. Given these rulings, the Court did not award the Proceeds to any 
of the claimants. Instead, itremandedthe case to the trial court with instructions to distribute 
4
 In connection with his appeal, Parduhn sought a stay of execution in this Court. Prior 
to the time that stay was entered, the trial court had paid the proceeds to the defendants. This 
Court ordered the defendants to pay back into court all funds they still had in their 
possession. Although the Buchi Children repaid most of the funds they had received, Joanne 
Buchi had used her portion of the funds to pay off the mortgage on her house and did not 
return any of the proceeds she had received. See accounting filed by Joanne Buchi, R. 1718-
1719. 
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the proceeds pursuant to §31A-21-104(5) to "some person who is equitably entitled to 
them." Utah Code Ann. §31A-104(5). 
After noting that the word "person" includes a partnership, the Court stated, 
"[p]roperty acquired with partnership funds are [sic] presumed to be assets of the 
partnership, including insurance on the life of a partner" and concluded that "in the event the 
insurance policy is an asset of the partnership, the proceeds would be divided... pursuant 
to the partnership agreement regarding asset division at winding up." (Id at 987, f^ 17 n.3.) 
The Court then noted that" the trial court found that the intent of the partners was to keep 
the cost equal for the partnership and that the partnership in fact paid the premiums." Id 
Following remand, the Buchi Heirs filed a pleading styled "Amended Order and 
Judgment on Remand," but filed no motion with it. R. 1890-1893. Upon the objection of 
Parduhn, the court ordered the "Amended Order" be treated as a motion, and ordered 
responses to be filed within ten days. R. 1649. Within the time set by the court for 
responses to the "Amended Order," the Partnership moved to intervene of right pursuant to 
Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P. R. 1746-1750. At the same time, it filed an objection to the 
"Amended Order" and a motion for an order awarding the proceeds of insurance policy to 
the Partnership. R. 1724-1745. The Buchi Children and Joanne Buchi argued the timeliness 
of University Texaco's motion to intervene, but did not challenge University Texaco's right 
ot intervene on other grounds.5 
5
 The Buchi Heirs argued that the motion was barred by the scheduling order entered 
(continued...) 
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The trial court heard oral argument from University Texaco, Parduhn, the Buchi 
Children and Joanne Buchi on both the motion to intervene and the ultimate disposition of 
the Policy proceeds. Some of the argument presented included reference to facts not in 
evidence before the court.6 The court declined to hold an additional hearing to take new 
evidence, however, and purported to rule solely on the evidence provided at trial, without 
considering the additional materials provided to it in the pleadings on remand. R. 1902. 
In a Memorandum Decision, the court denied University Texaco1 s motion to intervene 
as untimely, and again ordered the insurance proceeds paid one-half to Joanne Buchi and 
one-half to the Buchi Children. R. 1894-1906 (copy attached). The court held that although 
"the buy-sell agreement was no longer effective, as decided by the Supreme Court, it does 
provide guidance in deciding Buchi and Parduhn's intent when they obtained the policies 
with the intent to provide their respective heirs with immediate funds and to cash out the 
surviving partner's interest in the partnership". R. 1902. The court believed that such intent 
was "clear" and that Buchi and Parduhn intended the Buchi Heirs to be the "sole 
beneficiaries" of the Policy. Id "If they intended the surviving partner to retain any portion 
5
 (...continued) 
by Judge Stirba setting a cut off date for adding new parties, the statue of limitation for 
bringing an action on a written insurance policy and by laches. R. at 1770-1774; 1781-1784. 
6
 Parduhn and University Texaco each argued that the court could not award the 
proceeds to the Buchi Heirs without hearing additional evidence. The Buchi Children and 
Joanne Buchi each argued that no additional evidence needed to be taken; however, they too, 
relied on facts not in evidence in their briefs and during oral argument. See, e.g. Hr'g Tr. at 
24-25; see Point H.B. below. 
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of the proceeds, the court believes that such a provision could have and would have been 
provided to show such intent." Id. 
Parduhn and University Texaco filed this appeal following issuance of a final 
judgment by the trial court on June 18, 2003. R. 1972-1973. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
University Texaco raises two issues in this Appeal. 
First, the trial court should have allowed University Texaco to intervene of right 
because (a) its motion was timely, given the Supreme Court's opinion and the unusual 
circumstances of this case; (b) it claims an interest in the subject matter of the action; and 
(c) its interests were not adequately represented by the existing parties. Rule 24(a), 
governing intervention of right, requires only that a potential intervenor make a timely 
application, claim an interest in the property or transaction at issue, and be situated such that 
disposition may impair or impede the intervenor's ability to protect its interest. Timeliness 
is not a mechanical concept, but must be determined from the facts and circumstances of 
each case. Jennerv. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983). Courts must 
examine in particular whether substantial justice favors intervention, and whether 
intervention will prejudice existing parties. Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 778 S.W.2d 670, 
673 (Mo. App. 1989). 
Here the circumstances required the court to grant University Texaco's motion to 
intervene. This Court had rejected the legal claims of both the Policy beneficiary and the 
11 
asserted beneficiaries of the Buy Sell Agreement. It remanded the case for the express 
purpose of determining, in equity, who was entitled to the proceeds of the Policy on the life 
of Brad Buchi. The Court remanded with instructions to consider the Partnership's claim 
in equity to the proceeds. None of the existing parties can be prejudiced by University 
Texaco's intervention at this point, because this court's remand required the court to re-visit 
the issues and hold additional proceedings, whether or not University Texaco intervened. 
Because the trial court refused to consider all the circumstances, this court must reverse the 
decision below and grant University Texaco's motion to intervene. 
Second, the court should have awarded the Policy proceeds to University Texaco in 
equity. Of all the claimants, University Texaco was the only one whose claims this Court 
had not already rejected. Equity rests in the sound discretion of the court, but where the 
court's exercise of discretion has no foundation in the record, this Court must reverse. 
Millard County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1991); Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1095 (Utah 1991). Equity required the trial court to deal fairly with 
all concerned, and to fashion a remedy based on the evidence before it that would achieve 
a proper balance of conflicting interests. The trial court instead ignored the evidence in the 
trial record and relied on assertions of counsel wholly unsupported in the trial record. The 
trial court committed reversible error in relying on extra judicial facts and in discarding 
inconvenient facts to avoid a decision in favor of the Partnership. Thurston v. Box Elder Co., 
892 P.2d 1034, 1995 Utah Lexis 24, * 6-7. (1995). 
Equity required an award of the proceeds to University Texaco. Such an award would 
12 
have allowed the Court to "do equity" in the broadest way possible, by allowing everyone 
who had any economic interest in Brad Buchi's life to share in the proceeds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED UNIVERSITY 
TEXACO TO INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of University Texaco's motion to 
intervene as untimely. The Court believed that Parduhn, as the sole surviving partner, "had 
the duty and discretion to pursue any claims on behalf of University Texaco" and failed to 
do so prior to trial. R. 1899. The court erred in making that ruling. Timeliness is not a 
mathematical calculation, but depends on all the circumstances presented by each case, 
including the posture of the case at the time intervention is sought, whether the party seeking 
intervention could have done so earlier, and the relative prejudice to the parties and the 
intervenor. Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,1206 (5th Cir. 1994); Jenner v. Real Estate 
Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah 1983). The court also wrongly rejected University 
Texaco's motion to intervene on its view of the underlying merits. R. at 1900. 
("Furthermore, University Texaco did not have an interest in the proceeds..."). 
In denying University Texaco's motion to intervene, the trial court failed to consider 
any of the circumstances that support allowing the Partnership to intervene. It ignored this 
Court's express suggestion on remand that the Partnership was entitled to the proceeds in 
equity. It ignored the fact that at the time the Partnership sought to intervene, all the claims 
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advanced at trial had been rejected. It ignored the fact that the parties will suffer no 
prejudice from the Partnership joining the case on remand. It ignored the fact that anyone, 
including the Buchi Heirs or the court itself, could have joined the Partnership prior to trial, 
if they had viewed the Partnership having a potential claim to the proceeds.7 
In short, the court committed an abuse of discretion in denying University Texaco's 
motion to intervene. University Texaco filed its motion in a timely fashion, and satisfied all 
the requirements of Rule 24(a). This Court should reverse the trial court and allow 
University Texaco to intervene for the purpose of asserting a claim to the proceeds. 
A. Rule 24(a) Required the Trial Court to Look at All the 
Circumstances of the Case Before Ruling on University Texaco's 
Motion to Intervene. 
Rule 24(a) governs intervention as of right. That Rule states in relevant part: 
Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in 
an action... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, 
impair or impeded his ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
Rule 24(a), U.R. Civ. P. The rule does not define "timely" or give any guidance to the 
courts. However, Utah courts as well as other state and federal courts agree that timeliness 
is "aflexible concept." Kim v. H.V. Corporation, 688 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Haw. 1984). The 
court must look at the prejudice to the parties, the intervenor and whether the intervention 
7
 The court erroneously stated in its Memorandum Decision following remand that only 
Parduhn could have added University Texaco to the case. R. 1899. 
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will delay the proceedings. Reeves v ITT, 616 F.2d 1342,1349 (5th Cir. 1980) (in analyzing 
timeliness of motion for permissive intervention, "[a]n 'absolute measure of timeliness,'.. 
. is of little significance in determining the propriety o f the motion"). Cf Jenner v. Real 
Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983) (denying intervention under the facts 
before it, but recognizing that timeliness "must be determined under the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case and in the sound discretion of the court"); Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279,284 (Utah 1982) (allowing insurance company to intervene after 
summary judgment on liability). Even post judgment motions may be granted in appropriate 
circumstances. Jenner; United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1977) 
(unnamed class member allowed to intervene after judgment denying class status). 
"The requirement of timeliness is not a tool of retribution to punish the tardy 
would-be intervenor, but rather a guard against prejudicing the original parties by the failure 
to apply sooner. Federal courts should allow intervention 'where no one would be hurt and 
greater justice could be attained.'" Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205; see also 7c Wright, Miller 
& Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1916, at 425-26 (2d ed. 1986) (the 
"requirement of timeliness is not a means of punishment for the dilatory and the mere lapse 
of time by itself does not make an application untimely" (footnote omitted)).8 In Sierra 
Club, the court identified four factors by which to evaluate the timeliness of a motion to 
8
 Although these cases and authorities all involve the federal rule, F. R. Civ. P. 24(a) 
is identical to Utah Rule 24(a) in all material respects. Compare Rule 24(a), F.R. Civ. P. 
(copy attached at Appendix Tab 2) and Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
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intervene: (1) the length of time applicants knew or should have known of their interest in 
the case; (2) prejudice to existing parties caused by applicants' delay; (3) prejudice to 
applicants if their motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances. 18 F.3d at 1205. 
It also noted that courts should not encourage premature intervention. Id. at 1206. 
Another state court, interpreting a rule essentially identical to Utah's Rule 24(a), held 
that the two most important factors are whether substantial justice favors intervention, and 
whether intervention will prejudice existing parties. Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 778 
S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. App. 1989) (noting at page 671 that the Missouri rule is "essentially 
the same" as Federal Rule 24(a)). "If the trial court failed to give appropriate consideration 
to these factors, then the decision is subject to reversal for an abuse of discretion." Id. The 
court here never examined these factors. 
The court also rejected University Texaco's motion based on the second requirement 
of Rule 24(a), when it found that University Texaco had "no interest" in the matter because 
the court was going to award the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs. Courts should look to 
pleadings to determine interest, however, not the likelihood of the intervenor prevailing. 
College Parkv. Jenkins, 819 A.2d. 1129, 1135 (Md. 2003). 
The trial court here denied the Partnership's motion to intervene without any 
substantial reasons for the denial. A court's denial of a motion to intervene is not 
unreviewable simply because the court has broad discretion; the denial must be based on 
substance, or it will be overturned. Millard County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 
459, 462 (Utah 1991) (reversing tax commission's denial of statutory motion for 
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intervention). As shown below, the record demonstrates that the court abused its discretion 
in denying the Partnership's motion to intervene without substantial reason. 
B. The Court Should Have Allowed University Texaco to 
Intervene, as it Met All Requirements of Rule 24(a). 
The district court erred in rejecting University Texaco's motion to intervene without 
considering the particular circumstances of this case when it filed its motion or the prejudice 
to the parties. Millard County, 823 P.2d at 462; College Park, 819 A.2d at 1135; Kim, 688 
P.2d at 1161; Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205; Long v. City of Hoover, 844 So. 2d 1273,1282 
(Ala. 2002). 
The trial court primarily rejected the Partnership's motion to intervene because it felt 
that the Partnership could and should have intervened at an earlier stage of these 
proceedings. The court faulted Parduhn for not having joined the Partnership earlier, 
surmising that Parduhn did not join the partnership because he "wanted the proceeds in full." 
R. 1899-1900. In fact, if the Partnership should have been joined prior to trial, the 
responsibility for joinder more properly fell to Natalie Buchi Bennett. First, early in the 
history of this suit Parduhn filed a motion to force Natalie Buchi to join all necessary parties. 
(See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Counterclaimant to Join Necessary 
Parties of Dismiss Counterclaim, R. at 253-265.) In response, the rest of the Buchi children 
and Joanne Buchi joined with Natalie as counterclaimants. R. 275-281. None of them 
sought to have the Partnership join. 
Second, it was the Joanne Buchi, not Parduhn, who albeit belatedly raised the issue 
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of Utah Code Ann. §31 A-104(5) to argue that Parduhn should not receive the proceeds. She 
did not suggest that the statute might give the Partnership (or anyone other than the Buchi 
Heirs, for that matter) a right to the proceeds. R. 1096-1102. Nor did she put on evidence 
of who might be entitled to the proceeds under that section. She did not argue that anyone 
other than herself and the Buchi Children had a right to the proceeds under any principle of 
law. 
Moreover, the Buchi Heirs had a greater interest than Parduhn in not joining the 
Partnership. An award to the Partnership would not only mean splitting the proceeds with 
Parduhn, but also it would require the proceeds to pass through the Buchi estate, giving 
creditors of the estate a portion of the proceeds as well. This the Buchi Heirs have 
consistently argued against. See Point H.C.2. below. 
In any event, the issues at trial relating to the Policy proceeds involved two narrowly 
drawn legal claims to the Policy proceeds. Parduhn asserted that the Policy, which named 
him beneficiary, entitled him to the proceeds, while the Buchi Heirs claimed that the Buy 
Sell Agreement entitled them to the proceeds. No one asserted a claim based in equity. The 
Court did not take evidence on anyone's equitable rights to the proceeds. The only time the 
subject came up was in argument. See Tr. at 93; 202-203. Yet, even then, counsel for the 
Buchi Heirs argued only that under the statue the Buchi Heirs should get the entire proceeds 
because they were related to Buchi. Id. 
The Partnership was not named as a beneficiary of either the Policy or the Buy Sell 
Agreement, and never had any basis in law to claim the Policy Proceeds. Until this Court's 
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ruling on appeal, no one had any reason to analyze whether someone other than the named 
Policy beneficiary or the beneficiaries of the Buy Sell Agreement might be entitled to the 
proceeds. For the Partnership to have intervened prior to trial would have required the 
Partnership to anticipate this Court's holding on appeal. The law does not require potential 
litigants to anticipate all possible claims and outcomes. See, e.g. Frost, 778 S.W.2d at 673-
74 (refusing to uphold denial of motion to intervene even though intervenor knew of the 
pendency of the case, but waited until after trial to intervene). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Partnership could have successfully intervened 
prior to trial, the other factors the court failed to consider mandated allowing intervention 
following remand. This case does not involve an intervenor attempting to set aside or change 
a judgment that has become final. University Texaco did not sit on the sidelines waiting to 
see what the outcome would be and then seeking to alter the outcome. Instead, the Supreme 
Court itself invited the intervention and changed the posture of the case, through its reversal 
of the trial court and its holding that none of the parties had a legal right to the proceeds. 
The remand required the district court to start over and award the proceeds to a different 
party on a different basis form that originally considered by the court. By its comments in 
footnote 3, the Court invited the trial court to open the universe of potential claimants 
beyond those already before the court, particularly University Texaco. 61 P.3d at 987, 
f 17n.39 As a result, University Texaco's intervention does not involve the same concerns 
9
 At the hearing following remand, the Buchi Heirs suggested that perhaps Blackett Oil 
(continued...) 
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that would ordinarily confront a court faced with a post judgment motion to intervene. 
Moreover, neither the Buchi Heirs nor Parduhn showed any prejudice from allowing 
University Texaco to intervene at this time. The Buchi Children baldly asserted that "the 
rights of existing parties would be highly prejudiced because additional discovery, delay and 
costs would certainly result from intervention by University Texaco." R. 1784. Joanne 
Buchi claimed that to allow University Texaco to intervene would "delay... distribution of 
the proceeds of the life insurance..." R. 1774. Beyond their mere allegations, however, the 
Buchi Heirs could not demonstrate actual or potential prejudice. 
Given the posture of this case, no prejudice could have resulted to the parties from the 
intervention of the Partnership. First, the court had already scheduled briefing and 
determined to hold an argument on the issue on remand. R. 1649. University Texaco filed 
its briefs within the time allotted by the court. R. 1724-1750. Second, as the Partnership 
argued below, the trial court could have ordered the proceeds distributed to the Partnership 
without taking new evidence or incurring additional delay beyond that caused by the Court's 
remand. Even without University Texaco in the case, the Court's order of remand made 
clear that the trial court would have to consider equitable issues that the parties had not 
9
 (...continued) 
would be entitled to the proceeds. If the asset purchase agreement between University 
Texaco and Blackett Oil (which was never introduced into evidence) purported to sell 
Blackett Oil assets such as the Policy, that suggestion would not have been far fetched. In 
fact, however, Blackett Oil purchased only the realty and limited associated personal 
property. The Buchi Heirs' suggestion, without factual basis, appears to have figured heavily 
into the court's holding, however. See Point II below. 
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raised at trial. If in fact the court needed to hear new evidence, that need arose from this 
Court's reversal and remand instructions, not the intervention of University Texaco.10 
In any event, the Buchi Heirs misconstrue "prejudice." "The prejudice prong of the 
timeliness inquiry 'measures prejudice caused by the intervenors' delay - not by the 
intervention itself." Utah Association of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246,1251 (10th Cir. 
2001), quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 828 (5th Cir. 1998). Obviously, the Buchi 
Heirs would have preferred that the trial court simply award them the proceeds without any 
fiirther hearing, and anything to prevent that would cause them to "suffer." But that 
sufferance does not constitute "prejudice" and it does notresult from the timing of University 
Texaco's motion; it merely results from the proper application of the law. 
Neither the Buchi Heirs nor Parduhn will suffer prejudice if University Texaco is 
allowed to intervene. University Texaco filed its motion to intervene in a timely manner 
after remand, within the time set by the trial court for motions on the issue remanded. No 
proceedings in furtherance of the remand had yet occurred when University sought 
intervention. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court and allow University 
Texaco to intervene for the purpose of asserting its right, in equity, to the proceeds of the 
Policy. Utah Assoc, of Counties, 255 F.3d atl251.u 
10
 In their briefs and in oral argument, University Texaco and Parduhn made several 
proffers of the evidence that the court should hear before making any decision to award the 
proceeds to the Buchi Heirs in equity. See Point II below. 
11
 If the Court for any reason affirms the denial of University Texaco's Motion to 
(continued...) 
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POINT H. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE 
POLICY PROCEEDS TO THE PARTNERSHIP IN EQUITY 
Merriam Webster's On-Line dictionary defines "equity" as "justice according to 
natural law or right; specifically: freedom from bias or favoritism." Equitable means 
"dealing fairly and equally with all concerned." Merriam-Webster Online, 
http://www.merriamwebster.com/. 
This Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to determine the 
person to whom it should award the proceeds in equity. Instead, the lower court used a chain 
of unsupported inferences to run roughshod over the concepts of justice, fairness and 
impartiality. It awarded the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs without a shred of factual, equitable 
or legal basis for its decision. In doing so, it ignored the evidence in the record and proffers 
of additional facts that supported an award to the Partnership and contradicted the award to 
the Buchi Heirs. 
Equity may rest in the discretion of the court, but that discretion must have some 
foundation in the record. Millard County,*!! P.2d ntA62\Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 
1095 (Utah 1991). Here, no such foundation exists. The court instead based its decision 
solely on the unsubstantiated arguments made by counsel for the Buchi Children and the 
Buchi Heirs. This Court cannot allow the ruling to stand. 
11
 (...continued) 
Intervene, the Court should treat this Memorandum as an amicus curiae brief and still hear 
arguments of the Partnership. 
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In Bellon, the Court recited the standard language of review, saying it would not set 
aside a trial court's findings of fact in a case at equity or law "unless clearly erroneous." 808 
P.2d at 1094. However, said the Court, where the appellate court has "a definite and firm 
conviction" that the trial court has made a mistake of fact, it must reverse on that basis. Id. 
at 1095, quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). No greater mistake of fact 
can be made than basing a decision entirely on facts outside the record. As shown below, 
the trial court did just that. This Court must reverse the decision of the court as contrary to 
the facts and law. 
A. The Court's Ruling in Favor of the Buchi Heirs Has No 
Support In the Record. 
University Texaco and Parduhn specifically asked the court to take new evidence. 
The court allowed counsel to include in argument various points of fact not introduced into 
evidence in the trial. Nonetheless, the court expressly declined to hold a hearing or second 
trial to consider new evidence, stating: 
The court believes that [evidence received at trial] is the best 
evidence as to the intent and conduct of the parties, rather than 
now entertaining someone's opinion and rather than now 
hearing/acte tailored to the issue before the court 
R. 1902 (emphasis added). 
In the pages of its Memorandum Decision the court devoted to explaining why it 
would not award the proceeds to University Texaco, however, not one of the "facts" relied 
on by the court exists in the trial record. 
Although the remand instructions did not direct the district court to take additional 
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evidence, certainly this Court could not have intended the trial court to enter an order 
supported only by assumptions, suppositions or naked assertions made by counsel in 
argument. Where instructions on remand are not specific about subsequent proceedings, the 
trial court "has discretion to deal with those issues as it sees fit, including allowing 
supplemental filings or proceedings." 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 973 P.2d 
992 (Utah Ct App. 1999), quoting Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). Where a court chooses not to take new evidence on remand, it cannot simply 
find a fact to be true because it wants the fact to be true, or because the record contains no 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, in 4447 Associates, the court rejected as unsupported a 
defense the defendant attempted to raise for the first time following remand. The new 
defense required evidence that the defendant acted in good faith and in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The defendant presented no new evidence, arguing that the absence of 
evidence of bad faith or unreasonableness in the record established the defense. 973 P.2d 
at 997,1(17. The court rejected that argument, holding that the record contained insufficient 
evidence to establish the defense. Id., |18. 
In this case, of course, the new issue was raised by the Supreme Court, not by one of 
the parties. However, that distinction did not give the district court the luxury of filling 
evidentiary holes with its own suppositions to find in favor of the Buchi Heirs, wholly 
unsupported by the record. On remand, it was incumbent on the judge to ensure that the 
record contained sufficient facts on which to base the decision, or order the taking of 
additional evidence. See In the Matter of the Adoption of W. A. T., 808P.2d 1083 (Utah 1991) 
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(reversing dismissal of petition to adopt and remanding because the district court did not 
afford the petitioners a "comprehensive evaluation hearing"). 
Although the trial court stated it would not take additional evidence, it in fact based 
its distribution of the Policy proceeds to the Buchi Heirs instead of the Partnership on 
assertions of fact raised only in the argument of counsel. First, the court "found" that the 
sale to Blackett Oil in July 1997 involved all or substantially all the assets of the Partnership, 
and since Blackett Oil did not purchase the Policy, it could not have been a Partnership asset. 
R. 1902. Second, the Court claimed that other "evidence" produced at trial contradicted the 
evidence that the Partnership paid the Policy premiums. 
The trial court is wrong. These two "factual" prongs for the court's decision have 
absolutely no support in the record.12 This Court cannot allow such an unsupported ruling 
to stand. 
In oral argument on remand, counsel for the Buchi children raised for the first time 
an argument that had the Policy truly been an asset of the partnership, it would have, or 
should have, been sold to Blackett Oil. Transcript of Hearing, May 9,2003 (copy attached 
at Appendix Tab 5) ("Hr'g. Tr.") at 23. Apparently the court found this argument persuasive, 
12
 Of course, it is impossible to cite to an absence of a fact, so no particular pages of the 
trial transcript are here cited. However, if any testimony existed about the way the 
Partnership paid its bills, or the terms of the sale to Blackett Oil, it would most likely appear 
in the testimony of Glade Parduhn (Tr. at 16 to 58 and 153 to 154), or Lany Johnson (the 
Partnership's accountant) (Tr. 59 to 66). Counsel invites the Court to review those sections, 
and in fact the entire trial transcript, which consists of only 157 pages, excluding closing 
argument. 
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as it stated "that factor alone" indicated that the Policy did not belong to the Partnership. R. 
1902. The record, however, simply does not support a conclusion that the Policy was or 
should have been sold to Blackett Oil. The only testimony about the sale inferred that the 
stations, as opposed to all the assets, were sold: 
20 Q. What was the fate of the service stations on that 
21 date? What happened to them? 
22 A. They were sold. 
23 Q. To whom? 
24 A. Blackett Oil Company. 
Tr. at 31 (Glade Parduhn testifying, emphasis added). 
20 Q. And then on July 14th the service stations were sold 
21 to Blackett Oil Company, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
Tr. at 34 (Glade Parduhn testifying, emphasis added) 
18 Q. Now, are you aware that the stations were sold to 
19 Blackett Oil Company on July 14th, 1997? 
20 A. Yes. 
* * * 
5 Q. Since the sale of stations, what type — and I am not 
6 asking about - but what type of income has been earned by 
the 
7 partnership since the stations were sold? 
8 A. Interest. 
Tr. at 62-63 (Larry Johnson testifying, emphasis added). 
Such limited testimony does not support the court's conclusion. Had the court felt 
that the claims made by counsel raised a relevant factual issue, it should have taken 
additional evidence. Had it done so, it would have learned that the Partnership sold only 
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very specific assets to Blackett Oil. Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed by Parduhn, and Exhibit A thereto at R. 1932 and R. 1939-1946.13 
The rest of the "evidence" on which the court relied to deny the Partnership the 
proceeds similarly lacks a factual foundation in the record. The court stated that "the 
partners treated the partnership rather casually, basically taking what they needed in many 
instances." R. 1902-03. It referred to "evidence at trial that partnership proceeds were used 
to pay for various things that were not considered partnership assets." R. 1903. A search 
of the entire trial transcript and exhibits reveals no such evidence, nor anything that could 
be construed to support such a conclusion, even with great liberties of language.14 The only 
place such assertions exist are in the memoranda field by the Buchi Heirs following remand 
and counsel's argument to the court. Hr'g. Tr. at 24-25,36. After making his argument, Mr. 
Tanner assured the court that the record included the "facts" he was citing, saying 
"Absolutely. Absolutely it does."15 
13
 Upon being shown the falsity of its assumption about the sale, the court withdrew the 
statement. R. 1972-73. It did not change the conclusion it drew from that erroneous fact, 
however. 
14
 Counsel for Joanne Buchi did ask Parduhn about expenditures of Partnership funds 
after the sale to Blackett Oil. Neither those questions nor Parduhn's answers to them directly 
or indirectly support a conclusion that the Partnership so commingled funds that its payment 
of the premiums should be ignored. Tr. 57 (Glade Parduhn testimony). Nor did counsel 
attempt to draw such an inference from the answers. See Tr. 188 (argument of Counsel for 
Buchi Children). 
15
 In so assuring the court, Mr. Tanner cited to the memorandum filed by Joanne Buchi. 
Hr'g. Tr. at 25. However, that memorandum clearly admitted that the "facts" it recited on 
(continued...) 
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Argument of counsel and exhibits to memoranda do not substitute for evidence 
admitted under appropriate evidentiary safeguards. Because the court declined to hear 
additional evidence, it could only look to the evidence admitted at trial in fashioning an 
equitable distribtuion. Not only did that evidence show that the Partnership paid the 
premiums on the Policy, therefore presumptively making the Policy an asset of the 
Partnership, but no other claimant produced evidence of a stronger equitable right to the 
proceeds of the Policy to overcome that presumption. The trial court committed reversible 
error in relying on extrajudicial facts and in discarding inconvenient facts to avoid a decision 
in favor of the Partnership. Thurston v. Box Elder Co., 892 P.2d 1034,1995 Utah Lexis 24, 
* 6-7. (1995). This court should reverse the decision of the court below and enter judgment 
in favor of the Partnership based on the record evidence.16 
B. The Evidence Supports an Award of the Policy Proceeds to the 
Partnership. 
In footnote 3 of its opinion in the first appeal, this Court noted that the word "person" 
as used in Utah Code Annotated §31A-21-104(5) includes ^ partnership. 61 P.3d at 987 n.3, 
1fl7. The Court then stated that "[p]roperty acquired with partnership funds are [sic] 
presumed to be assets of the partnership" and concluded that "in the event the insurance 
15
 (...continued) 
this point were not before the court. R. 1858. 
16
 As shown below, the evidence would allow this Court to reverse and enter judgment 
in favor of University Texaco. At the very least, however, the Court should reverse and 
remand again with specific instructions to the court to hold an additional evidentiary hearing 
to determine who is equitably entitled to the proceeds. 
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policy is an asset of the partnership, the proceeds would be divided . . . pursuant to the 
partnership agreement regarding asset division at winding up. Id. 
At the trial in this case, Glade Parduhn testified that the Partnership paid the 
premiums on the Policy. Tr. 46 (Glade Parduhn, cross examination).17 This testimony 
remained uncontroverted throughout trial. Based on that testimony, the trial court found that 
"the partnership in fact paid the premium." R. 1452. The Supreme Court adopted this 
finding on appeal. 61 P.3d at 987 n.3, [^17) The finding thus became part of the case on 
remand. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037 ("'law of the case' is a legal doctrine under which a 
decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the 
same litigation") citing Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990); see also Waters v. 
Jorgenson, 29 P.3d 2, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (finding that second district judge had erred 
in entering order that contradicted facts found in earlier order in the case, without taking any 
new evidence). A lower court "is bound to follow [instructions from the appellate court], 
even though it considers the ruling erroneous." Slattery v. Covey, 909 P.2d 925,928 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995), quoting Streetv. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60,191 P.2d 153, 
158 (1948). 
When this Court remanded the case to the trial court, it identified several factors the 
court should consider in determining whether the Policy should be deemed an asset of the 
17
 In fact, the other parties had an incentive to put on evidence to the contrary, as such 
evidence would have bolstered their contention that they were entitled to the proceeds. 
However, in spite of ample opportunity to do so, no one challenged this evidence. 
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Partnership. 61 P.3d at 987, citing 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 359 (1987) and 56 
A.L.R.3d892. Of those factors, "the most important [are] the source ofthe premiums, and 
the beneficiary designated." 56 A.L.R.3d 892, 895 (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing principals of law and this Court's adoption of the 
factual finding that the Partnership paid the Policy premiums, the trial court determined not 
to award the proceeds to the Partnership. It did so even as it acknowledged that the Policy 
named Parduhn as beneficiary and that the Partnership paid the premiums. It rejected those 
factors as not worthy of consideration, however: 
The Supreme Court noted that the partnership paid the 
premiums and that was a factor in determining the equity ofthe 
situation. It is a factor that seemingly favors distribution to 
the partnership. The Supreme Court also stated that the named 
beneficiary is a factor in determining who is equitably entitled 
to the proceeds. Of course what makes this case difficult, 
among other things, is that here the partnership paid the 
premiums but Parduhn was the named beneficiary. Whatever 
guidance this court can take from [these factors] is thus diluted 
as those factors are opposed to each other and lead to different 
"equities." 
R. 1901. 
To solve the apparent conundrum, the court turned to the very document this Court 
had akeady rejected as a basis to award the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs: the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. 
The court found that the Buy Sell Agreement "provide[d] guidance in deciding Buchi 
and Parduhn's intent when they obtained their policies." R. 1902. The court may be correct 
in finding guidance in the Buy Sell Agreement; it certainly erred in interpreting that 
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guidance. To the court, the Buy Sell Agreement indicated that Buchi and Parduhn must have 
intended the heirs of a deceased partner to get the entire proceeds of any insurance policy. 
This is not an error of fact, as again, no fact exists to support the conclusion the court draws 
from the Buy Sell Agreement. Rather, it is an error of interpretation, an error of law. As 
such, it is entitled to no deference by this Court. Parduhn, 61 P.3d at 984 \5. 
One cannot find an intent to have the full amount of the 1989 policies included in the 
Buy Sell Agreement as it stood at Brad Buchi's death. The Buy Sell Agreement, following 
the 1984 amendment, contained clear direction that directly contradicts the court's 
interpretation: 
"The Buy-Sell insurance will be $100,000. In the event of a 
death of either partner, the remaining partner shall pay 
$100,000 to the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of 
the $100,000 insurance policy which each own on each other." 
The Buy Sell Agreement does not say "the Buy-Sell insurance will be $300,000." It does 
not say "the remaining partner shall pay all the proceeds to the survivors of the deceased."18 
Whatever the partners might have done, or might have thought about doing, they did not 
amend the Buy Sell Agreement again after 1984. Clearly, Buchi and Parduhn knew how to 
amend the Buy-Sell Agreement, as they had done just that in 1984 when they first increased 
the amount of life insurance they carried on each other. Pltf. Ex. 2. Just as clearly, they did 
not do so again in 1989, nor in the following eight years until Buchi's death. The mere fact 
18
 Interestingly, prior to 1984, the Buy Sell Agreement provided "Both partners are 
insured for $20,000 and all of which will go to the deceased persons wife or survivors." 
Pltf.. Ex. 1. 
31 
that Buchi might have considered doing so in 1990 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3), does not 
support a finding that he "clearly" intended 100% of the proceeds to go to his heirs, 
especially in light of other evidence (Lissa's divorce suit, filed Sept 1990 (Tr. 109-110); his 
purchase of other insurance for his family at the same time (Tr. at 117-118)). 
Yet, the court held that "[i]f they [Buchi and Parduhn] intended the surviving partner 
to retain any portion of the proceeds, the court believes that such a provision could have and 
would have been provided to show such intent." R. 1902. Neither logic nor the evidence 
the court had before it supports this reasoning. First, Parduhn testified as to his intent. He 
stated that he never intended the family of Buchi to get more than the $ 100,000 stated in the 
face of the Buy Sell Agreement. Tr. at 27. He testified that he and Brad Buchi did not 
amend the Buy Sell Agreement at the time or after they bought the Policy in 1989, and never 
discussed amending it. Id. Brad Buchi, of course, could not testify to his intent.19 
Moreover, uncontradicted testimony established that at about the same time that Buchi and 
Parduhn took out the Policy and the similar policy insuring Parduhn's life, Buchi also 
purchased additional insurance on his life that named his then wife Lissa and his children as 
19
 Lissa Buchi, Brad Buchi's wife in 1984 and 1989 did testify that she intended the 
entire Policy proceeds to be paid to the heirs of the deceased partner. Tr. at 100-101. She 
also testified that the divorce court ordered Brad to keep the $300,000 Policy in force. Tr. 
at 105-106. On cross examination by Parduhn's counsel, however, she corrected herself, 
stating that the policy the court ordered Brad to maintain was a different policy that named 
her as beneficiary. Tr. at 113, Pltf. Ex. 5; Tr. at 120, Pltf. Ex. 21. At the time of Brad's 
death, three of their five children were financially dependent on him. Tr. at 105-107. This 
testimony is at odds with Parduhn's proffer, discussed below. She also testified that in the 
conversations with Glade Parduhn, no discussion about the Policy proceeds going to him 
came up. Tr. at 108. 
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beneficiaries. Tr. at 104,188, 120-121, Pltf.. Ex. 5 & 21. Sheldon Hanson, the insurance 
agent who wrote the 1984 policies as well as the 1989 policies and other life insurance 
policies Brad Buchi purchased to benefit his family directly, testified that Buchi intended to 
have insurance both for his family and for his partner: 
13 Q. So, the buy/sell insurance was aside from some 
14 addition substantial amount of insurance he [Buchi] had 
acquired in 
15 some other fashion, correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. Is it very common in your practice and in your 
18 experience for a person to want to have a policy such as the 
19 policy that Brad Buchi purchased for Lisa and the children in 
20 addition to the benefits that they would be entitled to under a 
21 buy/sell agreement-type policy? 
22 A. Yes, I think that was Brad's intent, that they had 
23 their own individual coverage — I am sorry, a coverage on 
him 
24 for their specific direct benefit, coverage on him for the 
25 benefit of the partner. 
Tr. at 148 (emphasis added). 
Given the testimony of Parduhn and Sheldon Hanson, and the clear language of the 
1989 Buy Sell Agreement, one can only conclude that if the partners intended the survivors 
of the deceasedpartnerto get more than the $100,000 specified in the Buy Sell Agreement, 
such a provision could have and would have been provided to show such intent. It was not, 
and the court committed error in reading such an amendment into the document. 4447 
Associates, 973 P.2d at 997 f 18. This error is reversible, because the court relied solely on 
this non existent "intent" in awarding the entire proceeds to the Buchi Heirs. 
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Because the facts do not support the award to the Buchi Heirs, the decision must be 
reversed. Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1094. 
C. The Equities Favor Distribution of the Proceeds to the 
Partnership. 
In addition to the legal presumption that the Partnership should receive the proceeds 
because it paid for, and thus owned the Policy, die equities also favor distribution of die 
proceeds to the Partnership. The court's ruling, however, utterly failed to take into account 
the equities favoring distribution to the Partnership, and the lack of equities favoring 
distribution to the Buchi Heirs. No other party has or could establish a stronger equitable 
claim to the proceeds. 
This case originally involved a $300,000 life insurance policy, a terminated Buy-Sell 
Agreement that never addressed anything other than the first $ 100,000 of insurance, and two 
competing camps of claimants - die decedent's former partner, and his family members. 
This Court has already rejected the claims of Parduhn and the Buchi Heirs. 61 P.3d at 986 
[^15 and ^ [16. This Court rejected those claims even in the face of dictum by the district court 
that it would have awarded the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs in equity. R. 1456-57.20 On 
remand, the court again awarded the proceeds to die Buchi Heirs, this time citing the family 
20
 That dictum, based on an assumption that the Buchi Heirs had an insurable interest 
is irrelevant to the decision on remand, because 31A-21-104(5) requires analysis without 
regard to insurable interest or consent. In any event, having an insurable interest would not 
make the Buchi Heirs beneficiaries of the Policy. Insurance law is clear that on a legal basis 
at least, only a named beneficiary has a right to policy proceeds. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. v. 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519,522 (Utah 1993), citing Browning v. Equitable LifeAssur. Soc., 80 P.2d 
348, 352 (1938). 
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relationship and the Buy Sell Agreement. When stripped of the court's unfounded reliance 
on a non-existent intent in the now terminated Buy Sell Agreement, however, the court's 
award to the Buchi Heirs rests solely on the familial relationship. See R. 1903 ("When 
considering the equitable claims of the other potential universe of claimants, including that 
of a long-term business partner, the court finds in favor of the family"). The family 
relationship alone, however, cannot support the award to the Buchi Heirs in equity, as it 
ignores the reality of the relationships between Brad Buchi and the defendants as well as the 
claims of Glade Parduhn and University Texaco. 
1. Equity Does Not Support Distribution of the 
Proceeds to The Buchi Heirs. 
The trial did not include any evidence on the nature of the relationship between Brad 
Buchi and any of the Buchi Heirs. The record does not disclose whether the Buchi Children 
were estranged from or on good terms with Brad Buchi, or whether they had at his death any 
economic interest in his life.21 Nor did the trial deal with the quality of the relationship 
between Joanne Buchi and Brad Buchi, although the evidence did show that she had sued 
him for a divorce. R. 151. Thus the record does not support the award to the Buchi Heirs 
in equity. Nor did the Buchi Heirs proffer any new facts on remand that would support 
distribution to themselves in equity. 
21
 Interestingly, none of the Buchi Children testified at trial. The trial contained no 
evidence of the relationship between Brad Buchi and his children, other than Lissa Buchi's 
statement that the children were dependent on him for child support and some even lived 
with him. Tr. at 108. 
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In fact, had the court considered all the circumstances, and sought to reach a result 
that would be equitable for all concerned, he would have considered the proffers by Parduhn 
and University Texaco. Although no evidence came in at trial about the quality of the 
relationships between Brad Buchi and his children, counsel for Parduhn proffered evidence 
at trial that would have shown that the children no longer had an economic interest in 
Buchi's life at the time of his death. See Tr. at 128-129. Parduhn's counsel attempted to 
introduce through Lissa Buchi evidence that Brad Buchi had actually satisfied fully his child 
care obligations prior to his death, but the court upheld an objection to the line of 
questioning. Tr. at 123. Subsequently, Mr. Fishburn proffered that shortly before the 
dissolution of the Partnership, Buchi paid off his entire remaining child support obligations 
by giving his ex-wife a lien on Partnership property. When the Partnership sold the service 
stations to Blackett Oil, Lissa Buchi liquidated her lien and collected the full amount of 
Buchi's remaining child support obligations from the proceeds of the sale. Tr. at 128-129. 
In addition, Lissa Buchi testified that she was the primary beneficiary another $250,000 
insurance on Brad Buchi's life, as well as some term insurance. Tr. at 104,116. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 21, received into evidence at Tr. 120, showed that the Buchi Children received 
directly by assignment a $100,000 policy on Brad's life. 
This proffer and evidence should have at least put the court on notice that it could not 
award the proceeds to the Buchi Children without taking additional evidence. Buchi had 
provided amply for his children's support through other sources, negating any need for the 
court to search for an intent to have them receive fully half the entire Policy proceeds as 
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well. 
The trial record also contained enough evidence about Joanne and Brad Buchi's 
relationship to indicate to the court that the mere fact that Joanne was "legally married" to 
Brad Buchi did not mean she had a right - legally or in equity - to the proceeds of his life 
insurance. Utah Code Ann §31A-21-104, as interpreted by this court in the first appeal of 
this case, requires that a person have an insurable interest both at the time an insurance 
policy is purchased, and throughout the term of that policy, up to and including the death of 
the insured. 61 P.3d at 986,1(16. 
Joanne Buchi was not married to Brad Buchi when the insurance was procured. No 
one disputed that Joanne and Brad Buchi were separated and in the process of a divorce at 
the time of his death. Tr. at 151. The record contains no evidence of a warm and loving 
relationship between Brad and Joanne such that one could assume he intended Joanne to 
receive a portion of the proceeds. Thus, the record does not establish that Joanne Buchi had 
an insurable interest in Brad's life. 4447 Associates, 973 P.2d at 997. 
Moreover, the record reveals not one iota of evidence that would tend to support an 
award of the proceeds to Joanne Buchi individually on any other basis. What evidence does 
exist tends to show that she should not get any of the proceeds in equity. "In any equitable 
proceeding, the fundamental rule is that he who seeks equity must do equity." Tuttle v. 
Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1981). Joanne cannot meet this test. 
Joanne Buchi is the personal representative of Brad Buchi's estate, and she appeared 
in this case as such. R.275. She did not argue for an award to the estate in equity however; 
37 
to the contrary, she argued only that the proceeds should go to her individually in a non-
testamentary transfer. R. 1862. Her failure to articulate a position of the estate on remand, 
where the court had instructions to award the proceeds to the person(s) entitled to them in 
equity, cannot be overlooked in determining her own individual right to the proceeds in 
equity.22 
As the record now stands, no basis exists on which this Court can uphold the award 
of half the proceeds to Joanne Buchi or the Buchi Children in equity. The court should 
reverse the decision of the trial court and order Joanne Buchi to pay to University Texaco 
the proceeds she received from the court. If necessary, the Court should impose a 
constructive trust with Joanne Buchi as the trustee for University Texaco and impose a lien 
against her home. At a minimum, this Court should reverse the award as it applies to the 
Buchi Heirs, and order the trial court to take additional evidence on the actual relationship 
between Brad Buchi and his children as well as on the marital situation of Joanne and Brad 
Buchi and her actions as personal representative of the estate of Brad Buchi, to determine 
whether they have any claim in equity to the proceeds. 
2. Equity Requires an Award of the Proceeds to the 
Partnership. 
Equity favors distribution of the proceeds to the Partnership. Only through judgment 
for the Partnership can the court "achieve a proper balance of conflicting interests" and 
22
 A review of the pleadings filed in the Buchi Estate shows five claimants, other than 
Parduhn and University Texaco, made claims against the estate, totaling over $50,000. See 
Appendix, Tab 7. These claims were not introduced below. 
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provide "equal treatment of all concerned." Merriam Webster On-Line, 
www.merriamwebsteronline.com. The court's award to the Buchi Heirs was not based in 
impartiality, justice or fairness; it was not equitable. Neither the Buchi Heirs, nor any other 
potential claimant had any expectation in fact, law or equity of receiving the entire proceeds. 
Surely, Brad Buchi and Glade Parduhn did not intend the Buy Sell Agreement to provide a 
windfall to either the insured's partner or his survivors.23 Giving the award to the Buchi 
Heirs may have benefitted them, but it left out all other claimants and failed to achieve any 
kind of balance between conflicting claims. 
Although the Buchi Heirs and Glade Parduhn were the only claimants below, they 
were not the only persons with an economic interest in the partnership or Brad Buchi's life. 
Others include creditors of the Partnership and creditors of the estate of Brad Buchi. 
Certainly, Buchi's long term business partner also had an interest.24 The award to the Buchi 
Heirs entirely ignores the interests and equities of these other potential claimants, even 
though those interests were raised in argument. See e.g., Hr'g Tr. at 17-21; 43-47; 56-58; 
R. 1665-1672; 1735-1749; 1877-1881. 
Distribution of the Policy proceeds to the Partnership will ensure that not only the 
23
 Buy sell insurance simply provides the funds for one partner to buy out the other in 
the event of death; it should not replace other insurance on the lives of the partners, and did 
not do so here. See e.g., Tr. at 104, 118 and Pltf. Ex. 21. 
24
 Parduhn's economic interest in Buchi's life did not end with the dissolution of the 
Partnership. Parduhn asserted claims of conversion of partnership assets below, which 
remain unresolved, as the court bifurcated those issues from the issues now on appeal. See 
R. 1-8; 1272. 
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claimants below, but virtually all others with an economic interest in Brad Buchi's life or 
estate, will also get a portion of the proceeds. By ordering distribution of the proceeds to the 
Partnership, any remaining creditors of the Partnership can be paid, and the net assets 
divided between the estate of Bard Buchi and Parduhn, (after appropriate accounting and 
credit for any amounts shown to have been wrongfully taken by Buchi). Joanne Buchi as 
Buchi's surviving spouse, and the Buchi Children, will receive the net estate proceeds. 
An award to the Partnership will satisfy the requirements of 31A-21-104(5), fit the 
evidence in this case, and benefit Buchi's Heirs, as well as each other person or entity that 
had a stake in Buchi's life. Greater equity could not exist. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-104(5) requires that the Court award the Policy proceeds to 
a person or persons entitled to them in equity. That section also allows this Court to 
establish a constructive trust, if necessary to complete the equitable distribution of the 
insurance proceeds. Here, as shown above, the Court should reverse the trial court's award 
of the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs as an abuse of discretion, and remand with specific 
instructions to the court to distribute the proceeds to the Partnership in equity and to impose 
a constructive trust, with Joanne Buchi as constructive trustee of the proceeds she has already 
received. Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5). Furthermore, the Court should instruct the trial 
court to declare a lien on Joanne Buchi's home for the full amount of the proceeds she 
received, plus interest at the legal rate, until she pays the proceeds over to the Partnership 
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and order her to remit the entire amount of the proceeds, with interest, to the Partnership 
within 30 days of the order, or have judgment for the full amount due, with interest, entered 
against her. In the alternative, the Court should remand with specific instructions to the trial 
court to take additional evidence tailored to the specific issues before it in equity. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
lU/AyUj 
NANCI SNOW BOCKELIE 
Attorney for Intervenor/Appellant 
University Texaco 
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